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BDI Logics for BDI Architectures: Old Problems, New
Perspectives
Andreas Herzig1 • Emiliano Lorini1 • Laurent Perrussel1 • Zhanhao Xiao1,2
Abstract The mental attitudes of belief, desire, and
intention play a central role in the design and implemen-
tation of autonomous agents. In 1987, Bratman proposed
their integration into a belief–desire–intention (BDI) theory
that was seminal in AI. Since then numerous approaches
were built on the BDI paradigm, both practical (BDI
architectures and BDI agents) and formal (BDI logics). The
logical approaches that were most influential are due to
Cohen and Levesque and to Rao and Georgeff. However,
three fundamental problems remain up to now. First, the
practical and the formal approaches evolved separately and
neither fertilised the other. Second, only few formal
approaches addressed some important issues such as the
revision of intentions or the fundamentally paraconsistent
nature of desires, and it seems fair to say that there is
currently no consensical, comprehensive logical account of
intentions. Finally, only few publications study the inter-
action between intention and other concepts that are nat-
urally connected to intention, such as actions, planning, and
the revision of beliefs and intentions. Our paper summa-
rizes the state of the art, discusses the main open problems,
and sketches how they can be addressed. We argue in
particular that research on intention should be better con-
nected to fields such as reasoning about actions, automated
planning, and belief revision and update.
Keywords Belief  Desire  Intention  Goal  BDI logic 
BDI architecture
1 Introduction
The concepts of belief and goal play a central role in the
design and implementation of autonomous agents. These
concepts do not originate in the AI and multi-agent systems
literature but rather stem from philosophy of mind. There,
they are considered to be fundamental mental attitudes of
agents: beliefs have a ‘mind-to-world’ direction of fit
(agents try to adapt their beliefs to the truths of the world),
while intentions have a ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit:
agents try to make the world match their goals.
In his seminal 1987 book, Bratman proposed a richer,
more fine-grained analysis where goals are replaced by
desires and intentions [12]. His integrated account is called
belief–desire–intention model, BDI model for short. It was
well received in AI: numerous approaches adopted the BDI
paradigm, either from an implementation perspective—so-
called BDI agent languages and BDI software agents—or
from a purely formal perspective: so-called BDI logics,
with Cohen and Levesque’s [18] and Rao and Georgeff’s
[48] being most influential.
Our aim in this paper is to reexamine BDI logics and
their relation to BDI architectures. We provide an overview
of the state of the art, stress the main open problems, and
discuss how they can be addressed. Our main message is
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shortcomings. First, the practical and logical approaches
evolved separately and neither was fruitful for the other.
Second, none of the logical approaches addresses several
important issues that were not addressed in the original
Cohen and Levesque and Rao and Georgeff papers; in
particular, the instrumentality relation between intentions
is not accounted for in the logics, and in consequence there
is no appropriate account of intention refinement, which is
a fundamental concept in Bratman’s model. Third, the field
has always been poorly connected to other fields it should
naturally interact with, most importantly: automated plan-
ning, epistemic logic, paraconsistent logic, belief revision
and belief update, and action theory and reasoning about
actions. As we are going to explain, several promising
research avenues may take advantage of (mostly recent)
developments in areas such as revision theory and Hier-
archical Task Networks (HTN).
Throughout the paper agents (‘individuals’) are noted i,
j,. . ., actions are noted a, b,. . ., and propositional symbols
are noted p, q,. . .
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. , we recall
Bratman’s BDImodel, starting with its individual dimension
and pursuing with a discussion of the collective aspect of
intentions. In Sect. , we review existing BDI architectures
and highlight their shortcomings. In Sect. , we discuss three
logical renderings of Bratman’s BDI model: Cohen and
Levesque’s, Rao andGeorgeff’s, and Shoham’s. In Sect. we
formulate challenges for future research. Section concludes.
2 Bratman’s BDI Model
In his seminal book [12], Bratman highlighted the funda-
mental role of an agent’s future-directed intentions: they
are high-level plans to which the agent is committed and
that she refines step by step, finally leading to intentional
actions. Intentions therefore play a role that is intermediate
between goals, plans, and actions. In this section, we first
detail Bratman’s perspective on individual intentions and
next remind how collective or joint intention is linked to
individual intentions.
2.1 Individual Intentions
Being commitments, intentions are stable mental attitudes.
Indeed, according to Bratman there are only two possible
reasons to abandon an intention:
– either it turns out to be impossible to satisfy;
– or it is only instrumental for another, higher-level
intention the agent is about to abandon.
Here is an example involving both processes: suppose I
intend to take out a loan in order to buy a house and learn
that it has already been sold. Learning that I will not be
able to buy the house should make me drop both intentions:
I first abandon my high-level intention to buy the house
(because I learned that it cannot be achieved any more);
and then my instrumental intention to take a loan (because
would be useless to do so).
Intentions being high-level plans, they cannot be exe-
cuted directly: they have to be refined as time goes by,
resulting in more and more elaborate plans. At the end of
the refinement process there are basic actions, which are
the actions the agent can directly execute. For example, my
high-level plan to submit a paper to KI Zeitschrift is refined
into writing a paper and uploading it to a paper manage-
ment system; further down the line, the second intention is
refined into logging into the system, entering information
about the paper (authors, title, etc.) and uploading the PDF
file; all these are again high-level actions that have to be
further refined, down to basic intentions of typing words or
characters on my keyboard.
While intentions have to be refined in order to obtain
executable actions, this should not be done too early, for
two reasons. First, an agent’s memory and computational
power is limited and she is not able to store fully elaborate
plans for the far ahead future. Second, even if resources
were unlimited, the agent only has imperfect beliefs about
the future that may turn out to be wrong: fully worked-out
plans would force her to re-plan much more frequently than
more abstract, high-level plans would (the issue was also
highlighted in [14]). So when and how to refine an inten-
tion is a fundamental issue in an agent’s management of
her intentions.
Forming future-directed intentions enables agents to
extend the influence of their deliberations beyond the
present moment. This is important given the limited cog-
nitive capacities and time for deliberation of human agents.
Specifically, it may be the case that at time t an agent will
have less time to deliberate and think through the options,
or she may be distracted. For example, I may decide on
Sunday what to do during the next weekend since I know
that I will have a busy week at work and will have no time
to make my plan for the weekend. Another reason why
future-directed intentions are useful is that agents may be
sensitive to temptations negatively biasing their choice. For
example, a heavy smoker may decide to stop smoking at a
certain point in his life: he may decide that he will not light
up a cigarette at the later time when he will desire to smoke
it. By forming this future-directed intention, he commits
himself to do something later in order to contrast the
opposite force of his future temptation. The idea that
intentions imply some kind of commitment is explicit in
Bratman’s theory. It is this peculiarity which qualifies
intention for a functional role that mere desires do not play.
Once an agent has deliberated in favour of an action and
has formed the corresponding intention, he is ‘‘locked into’’
the project that he has decided to pursue and, in the absence
of relevant new information, the intention to do the action
will resist further reconsideration. Consequently, in being
the product of deliberation and having associated a kind of
commitment, intentions are characterized by an intrinsic
form of persistence which makes them more resistant to
temptations than desires.
Bratman’s theory is qualified as a planning theory of
intention and traditionally opposed to so-called cognitivist
theories of intention [28, 65]. While according to Bratman’s
theory, intention has certain distinctive functional properties
which cannot be adequately characterized by conceiving it
as a combination of a desire to do a certain action plus the
belief that one will do the action (or the belief that one will
possibly do the action), the cognitivist view defends the idea
that intention basically consists in the belief that one will act
in a certain way (or, will try to act in a certain way). Thus,
according to this view, an agent’s intention involves a sort of
self-referential aspect: the belief that an intention to perform
a certain action a in the future will be responsible for the
future occurrence of action a (or the future attempt to do the
action a). A formalization of this self-referential aspect of
intention is given in [39].
Before discussing the main challenges raised by Brat-
man’s model, we detail how individual intentions are the
fundamental bricks of joint intentions.
2.2 From Individual to Collective Intentions
Collective attitudes such as common goal and joint inten-
tion are traditionally studied in in the philosophical area to
account for the concept of collaborative activity
[13, 51, 61]. Notable examples of collaborative activity are
painting a house together, dancing together a tango, or
moving a heavy object together. Two or more agents acting
together in a collaborative way need to have a common
goal and need to form a joint intention aimed at achieving
the common goal. In order to make collaboration effective,
each agent has to commit to her part in the shared plan and
form the corresponding intention to perform her part of the
plan. Moreover, she has to monitor the behaviors of the
others and, eventually, to reconsider her plan and adapt her
behavior to new circumstances.
The concept of joint intention has been considered by
logicians and AI practitioners to account for the concept of
collaborative activity in multi-agent systems (cf. [21, 26]).
However, much work has to be done in order to develop
comprehensive formal theories of joint intention. The
interesting aspect of joint intention is the conditional nature
of the individual intentions composing it. Specifically, an
agent in a group has the intention to do her part in the
shared plan conditional on the fact that the other agents in
the group also intend to do their part. In this sense and as
Bratman emphasizes [13], the individual intentions com-
posing a joint intention form an interlocking web of indi-
vidual intentions. From this perspective, joint intention
refinement and revision are interdependent as: (1) the
refinement of an individual plan by an agent in the group
may lead to the refinement of an individual plan by another
agent in the group, and (2) the reconsideration of an indi-
vidual intention by an agent in the group may trigger the
reconsideration of an individual intention by another agent
in the group. For example, suppose two agents Mary and
Bob have the joint intention to paint a house together. Two
options are available: the house can be painted either in
blue or in green. Mary refines her individual plan by
deciding to paint the house in blue. Consequently, Bob has
to refine his individual plan in the same way by deciding to
the paint the house in blue. Now, suppose Mary reconsiders
her individual intention to paint the house in blue and
chooses to paint the house in green. In order to coordinate
with Mary effectively, Bob too should change his plan and
decide to paint the house in green.
To sum it up, joint intention cannot be considered before
individual intention is clearly characterized. Hereafter, we
only discuss issues and challenges raise by individual
intentions.
3 BDI Implementations and Their Shortcomings
Soon after Bratman’s and Cohen and Levesque’s papers,
the BDI paradigm inspired a multitude of models and
platforms aiming at the implementation of software agents.
Examples are KARO [42], 3APL [20], dMars [22],
AgentSpeak-Jason [6] and GOAL [34]. All these software
platforms are made up of a ‘B’, a ‘D’, and an ‘I’ component
that are interfaced appropriately. Such architectures are
inspired by the Intelligent Resource-bounded Machine
Architecture proposed by Bratman et al. [8]. Figure 1
Fig. 1 A typical BDI Implementation
contains a typical example taken from [7].1 As it can be
seen from the figure, sensor input leads to the modification
of beliefs (BRF stands for the belief revision function),
intentions are produced from desires by filtering with
beliefs, and intentions lead to actions.
In the rest of the section we discuss the shortcomings of
these models and platforms.
3.1 Lack of Formal Logical Semantics
Most BDI software models and platforms are semi-formal:
while they provide a taxonomy of basic concepts and their
relationships, the agent programming languages are usually
equipped with an operational semantics only and lack a
formal logical semantics. Typically, they support the
specification of BDI agents with respect to some specific
BDI implementation. For instance, language AgentSpeak
[7] enables to express what are the initial beliefs, actions
and plans available in an AgentSpeak-Jason implementa-
tion of a multi-agent system. More generally speaking,
there are only few attempts to formally relate BDI imple-
mentation and BDI logics. For example, the language of
AgentSpeak does not enable reasoning about the conse-
quences of an action. The main exception is Meyer et al.
work on the KARO framework [1, 4, 29]. However, it
seems to be fair to say that this logic and its mathematical
properties are not well understood yet.
A further weak point of BDI architectures (and conse-
quently of BDI agents) is that their associated agent lan-
guage is often severely restricted: it consists of literals, i.e.,
propositional symbols or their negations. Typically, the
dMars agent language requires that beliefs are only sets of
literals. In our view this is a major obstacle to the use of
BDI agents, for two reasons. First, it does not allow for
second-order beliefs, i.e., beliefs about other agents’
beliefs. Such beliefs—and more generally higher-order
beliefs—are however central for the reasoning of a socially
intelligent agent. Their fundamental role in human intelli-
gence was highlighted in experiments such as false belief
tasks [11]. In Game Theory, higher-order beliefs are at the
heart of the definition of notion of equilibrium as each
agent has to assume that the other agents are rational
[41, 59, 71].
Second, while some agent languages do allow for dis-
junctions (e.g. 3APL), most of them don’t (e.g. AgentS-
peak does not allow to express such kind of belief). This is
clearly a disadvantage: goals such as to know whether some
proposition is true cannot be expressed. This is highly
problematic if one wants to employ BDI agents as con-
versational agents, where agent i’s yes-no question whether
u is conditioned by i’s goal to know whether u is true and
where i’s speech act of informing j that u is conditioned by
i’s belief that j does not know whether u. This situation is
quite common for example in game playing.
3.2 Lack of Intention Refinement
As we have said, operations of refinement of intentions are
fundamental in the BDI model. As pointed by Rao and
Geogeff in [48], ‘‘the potential of non-primitive events for
decomposition into primitive events can be used to model
hierarchical plan development’’. One would therefore
expect refinement to be a central ingredient of any model
of autonomous agents. However, most of the papers in the
literature on BDI logics and BDI agents remain silent about
this concept. Indeed, from [35] to recent work [70],
mainstream implementations of BDI-agents have adopted
plan libraries: functions associating to each intention the
set of plans that can achieve it. Such approaches therefore
do not give any structure to an agent’s intentions: no
means-end relation between intentions is considered and
intentions are achieved in an isolated way by finding a
solution for each of them independently of the others. This
is also the case even when the focus is on the dynamics of
the intention base [60]. We believe that this is a major
shortcoming of such approaches.
Notable exceptions are [23, 50] which import ideas from
HTN planning and [24] which describes their concrete
implementation framework.
A Hierarchical Task Networks (HTN) is made up of a
hierarchy of actions (‘tasks’) that are either basic (‘primi-
tive’) or high-level (‘non-primitive’) [25]. Contrasting with
the classical planning approach, HTN-based plan genera-
tion decomposes high-level actions step-by-step into lower-
level actions. Actions fall into two categories: STRIPS-like
basic actions that can be executed directly and high-level
actions that cannot. An action network is a couple d ¼
½T;u consisting of a set of actions T and a boolean formula
u. It is achieved if the set of actions T are achieved and the
boolean formula u imposing restrictions on the temporal
occurrence of action instances and on their pre- and post-
conditions of actions holds. A decomposition method
ða;w; dÞ specifies that when formula w holds, high-level
action a can be decomposed into action network d: a is
going to be achieved once d is achieved. For example, the
method for the high-level action of submitting a paper to KI
Zeitschrift is conditioned by w = ‘‘the Easychair website is
available’’, and when that w holds then submitting a paper
can be decomposed into an action network d ¼ ½T ;u
where T consists of the two actions of writing a paper and
uploading it and constraint u expresses that the writing
action has to be performed before the uploading action.
The solution for an HTN planning problem P ¼ hd;B0;Di
1 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bdi-agent-architecture.
Viewed July 1st, 2016.
is a plan: a sequence of basic actions such that intended
(high-level) action network d will be achieved by decom-
posing them iteratively via predefined decomposition
methods in D, starting from the initial state B0.
As far as we are aware, there are few contributions
relating HTN concepts with BDI agents. In [23], de Silva
and Padgham show through experiments that BDI systems
are more suitable when facing highly dynamic environ-
ments, while HTN solutions are more efficient in a static
context. In [50], Sardina et al. integrate a BDI agent system
with an HTN offline planner as a ‘‘lookahead’’ component
and develop a BDI agent language CANPLAN. In their
architecture, an intention is a program consisting of prim-
itive actions and operations on these actions. The intention
is considered to be successfully executed if its corre-
sponding HTN network task is accomplished. Later in [24],
the authors propose a notion of ‘ideal’ (precisely, minimal
non-redundant maximally-abstract) plan and compute a
suboptimal ‘ideal’ plan, which is non-redundant and pre-
serves abstraction as much as possible, based on the hier-
archical decomposition generated by HTN planning. The
above approaches inherently restrict intentions to be han-
dled by an underlying predefined set of decomposition
methods in a static way. However, defining all possible
decompositions in the beginning may be a challenge for a
modeler.
To sum it up, intention refinement is absent from almost
all existing BDI implementations and we believe that it is
fundamental to incorporate means-end relations between
intentions into the picture, building on existing work in the
HTN and hybrid planning literature.
4 BDI Logics and Their Shortcomings
We now turn to BDI logics. We start with Cohen and
Levesque’s approach and the similar approach due to Rao
and Georgeff. As the reader will see, these logics are fairly
complicated. This leads us to Shoham et al. simpler data-
base approach which, we argue, provides an interesting,
simple alternative that however still lacks an account of
refinement.
4.1 Cohen and Levesque’s Linear Time Logic
Cohen and Levesque provided a seminal logical modeling
of Bratman’s BDI model [18] that was awarded the
IFAAMAS most influential paper award in 2006. Their
approach accounts for achievement intentions (as opposed
to maintenance intentions). It distinguishes intention-to-do
and intention-to-be and mainly focuses on the latter. The
definition of intention-to-be comes in four steps—chosen
goals, achievement goals, persistent goals and intentions—
that are couched in a quantified modal logic of linear time,
action, and belief.
1. Chosen goals corresponds to future states where the
agent would like to be.
2. Achievement goals are chosen goals that are not true
yet (more precisely: that the agent believes to be false
now).
3. Persistent goals are achievement goals that are only
abandoned when they are either achieved, or learned to
be unachievable, or ‘for some other reason’.
4. Intentions are persistent goals for which the agent is
prepared to act; this excludes persistent goals to which
the agent cannot contribute anything, such as my
persistent goal that there be snow at Christmas.
While Cohen and Levesque’s approach is much cited, it is
fair to say that it is rather complicated. Some early criti-
cisms of technical details can be found in [54]. In Shoham
and Leyton-Brown’s textbook the approach is called ‘‘the
road to hell’’ [57]. It speaks for itself that its mathematical
properties—such as axiomatizability, decidability and
complexity of fragments—were never investigated. None
of the BDI logics that were introduced subsequently—
starting with [48]—adapted Cohen an dLevesque’s four
steps definition of intention and instead considered inten-
tions to be primitive, the only exceptions being [30, 49].
Cohen and Levesque’s approach moreover has three major
shortcomings. First, it does not provide a solution to the
frame problem:2 what is true at different time points t and t0
may vary wildly and is not determined by the actions
occurring between t and t0. Second, it does not account for
intention refinement. Third, it does not fully account for
revision; indeed, while Cohen and Levesque provide some
criteria for the abandonment of intentions through the
notion of rational balance (forbidding to intend something
that is true or believed to be impossible to achieve), it does
not further analyze the ‘other reasons’ for which a persis-
tent goal is abandoned. These reasons should mainly cover
abandonment of goals that are instrumental for another,
higher-level goal that is dropped, and more generally
intention reconsideration.
4.2 Rao and Georgeff-Based Logics
Contrarily to Cohen and Levesque, Rao and Georgeff [48]
embrace a primitive notion of intention. It is based on the
branching time logic CTL*.
2 The frame problem, one of the main and oldest problems in
reasoning about actions, concerns the specification of the effects of
actions [43]. The main challenge is to characterize these effects
without explicitly specifying which conditions are not affected by
executing actions.
Just as Cohen and Levesque’s approach, Rao and
Georgeff’s suffers from the shortcomings that we have
listed above: intention revision is basically absent from the
picture and the frame problem is not solved. Indeed, due to
the temporal logic framework agents can perform actions
whose effects are not further specified. It is also not
described how beliefs are preserved while agents act.
Rao and Georgeff’s approach was fleshed out by
Winikoff et al. [69] who link intentions3 to the actions
associated to them by means of transition rules that are
close to the predefined refinement rules of HTNs. The
logical framework they propose, called Conceptual Agent
Notation, is defined in terms of a declarative and an
operational semantics. Together, they allow to reason about
the relations between goals, such as dependence, mutual
consistency, and mutual support. Overall, the framework is
rather complex and, just as all other existing BDI logics,
the frame problem remains unsolved: the framework
describes how sub-goals may be inferred (with respect to
some library of plans) but does not keep track of these
steps. In other words, no instrumentality relation between
the ongoing goals can be exhibited and consequently
revision cannot be handled in a rational way.
4.3 Shoham’s Database Perspective
Shoham recently argued for a simpler approach that he
baptized the database perspective [52]. His aim is to define
a framework that is simpler than Cohen and Levesque’s
and Rao and Georgeff’s and that thereby provides a more
suitable basis for the design and implementation of BDI
agents. Shoham abandons Cohen and Levesque’s idea to
express achievement goals by means of the temporal
‘eventually’ modality. His central idea is that beliefs and
intentions-to-do are organized in two temporal databases.
A belief database B is a set of pairs made up of time points
t in the set of non-negative integers N0 and literals p.4 They
are written pt and read ‘‘p is true at t’’. Similarly, an
intention database I is a set of pairs made up of time points
t and (basic) actions a. They are noted at and read ‘‘the
agent intends to do action a at time t’’.
Shoham supposes that each action a has pre- and post-
conditions. They are described by functions pre and post
mapping each action a to special atomic formulas preðaÞ
and postðaÞ.
Letting Bt be the set of t-indexed literals of B and It the
set of t-indexed actions of I, Shoham requires the following
coherence constraints:
1. Every Bt is consistent;
2. Every It is either empty or a singleton;
3. If a 2 It then Bt 6 :preðaÞ;
4. If a 2 It then Btþ1  postðaÞ.
Icard et al. [36] provide a semantics and an axiomatization
for such belief-intention databases in terms of sets of paths.
A path p associates to every non-negative integer t a set of
propositional symbols and an action: the propositional
symbols that are true at t and the action that is going to be
performed by the agent at t. A set of paths P is appropriate
if (1) on each path, the postcondition of each action at time
tþ1 is true and (2) once the precondition of each action is
satisfied at time t on p then it must be performed on some
path that is identical to p up to time t1.5 Intuitively, B and
I are coherent if the agent considers it possible to do all
actions she intends with respect to some appropriate set of
paths. Based on this formalization, Icard et al. propose
AGM-like postulates for the joint revision of beliefs and
intentions and provide a representation theorem.
Van Zee et al. [67] recently criticized that Icard et al.
logic is unsound because their axiom which describes the
appropriate set of paths is not necessarily valid. They
adapted Icard et al. logic by moving to a semantics a` la Rao
and Georgeff in terms of CTL-like tree structures, plus a
language with time-indexed modalities. They also provided
a sound and complete axiomatization of their new logic
w.r.t. the class of all models. They moreover gave an
example showing that Icard et al. coherence constraint
(which only considers the precondition of actions) is too
weak. They proposed a stronger coherence condition where
the pre- and postconditions of actions and beliefs are
always jointly consistent. Based on that logic, van Zee
et al. focused on the AGM-like revision of beliefs about
actions and time [66, 68]. They adapted the AGM
semantics of belief revision by adding a condition saying
that infinite models with the same finite prefix have the
same priority in the revision preorder. They then proved
representation theorems in the style of Katsuno–Mendelzon
and Darwiche–Pearl.
According to [53], the database perspective is at the
heart of the Personal Time Assistant (PTA), which is a
next-generation calendar helping people to manage time.
His Timeful application has intentions as its basic concept
and was developed within a start-up company that was
acquired by Google in 2015.
3 They use the term goals.
4 Shoham mentioned that the belief could be any formula indexed by
multiple time values, but does not elaborate this further. Such a
generalization should come with more complex notation and new
semantical and computational problems. 5 The time parameter t1 is missing in [36].
5 Challenges for Future Research
Let us now list some challenges that result from our dis-
cussions in the preceding sections. Underlying all these
challenges is a general desideratum: to provide a simpler
but nevertheless meaningful logic of intention encom-
passing the main concepts of Bratman’s BDI model, which
will hopefully bring about a tighter connection between
BDI implementations and BDI logics.
A second general desideratum concerns tractability. The
agent programming languages of BDI implementations are
typically restricted for the sake of efficiency, so that agents
can react on-line to a dynamic environment. One reason
explaining the distance between theory and practice is the
too high complexity of existing logics. To witness, model
checking for BDI Rao and Georgeff logic is already
PSPACE, and the satisfiability problem is way beyond.
However, tractable fragments of epistemic logics can be
isolated. Recent development in the logic of belief alone
(and thus not intention) has demonstrated that efficient
reasoning with at least some restricted forms of higher-
order belief is possible [40, 45]. A similar approach might
guide the definition of future BDI logics.
Another possible alternative for addressing tractability
are recent approaches based on a modular definition of
belief and intention. In [17], Casali et al. show how belief,
intention and desire interplay via a logic based on
Giunchiglia et al. multi-context systems [27]. They offer an
interesting approach showing how to switch between
intentions and beliefs in a simple, yet expressive way via
bridges rules.
In the rest of the section we offer a list of more detailed
challenges. The first is about intention refinement and
somewhat includes all others. We however list it separately
because it leads us to Shoham’s database perspective. It is a
promising research avenue, with a simple but still mean-
ingful and non-trivial account of intention.
5.1 Design and Integrate Intention Refinement
The refinement of intentions is fundamental and should be
a central ingredient of any model of autonomous agents.
However and as we have seen, the literature on BDI logics
and BDI architectures basically remain silent on this
aspect. As far as we know, the only exceptions are the work
of Padgham et al. [23, 50] and perhaps the work of
Hunsberberger and Ortiz [31].
While refinement is also missing in Shoham’s database
perspective, we believe the latter to be a good starting
point. Its temporal database associates to every time point a
set of propositional symbols that are true at that time point
and the action the agent intends to perform at that time
point (which takes one unit of time). This framework
should be extended by high-level actions which may
require more than one time unit: they are performed within
temporal intervals. To keep things simple one might start
with STRIPS-like actions or Reiter-style basic action the-
ories. On that basis, Bratman’s central relation of instru-
mentality between intentions should be studied. This
relation is, so to speak, instrumental in order to maintain an
intention database: on the one hand, we refine an agenda by
adding lower-level intentions (the means) that are instru-
mental for some high-level intention (the end) in the
intention database; on the other hand, during the revision of
an agenda, when we learn the unsatisfiability of a higher-
level intention we also drop all those intentions that are
instrumental for it, even if they can still be satisfied. Our
house buying example in Sect. illustrates the latter.
5.2 Integrate a Solution to the Frame Problem
None of the existing BDI logics solves the frame problem:
the agent’s beliefs at time point t together with her actions
at t do not determine her beliefs at tþ1. Indeed, even in
Shoham’s database perspective, when action a is executed
at time point t then its effect postðaÞ holds at tþ1, but there
is no guarantee that the propositional symbols that are not
affected by a have the same truth value at t and at tþ1.
This calls for an integration of existing solutions to the
frame problem, such as STRIPS-like actions or Reiter’s
basic action theories with successor state axioms [47], or
better its epistemic extension [55]. When one tries to
integrate, say, STRIPS-like actions into Shoham’s database
approach one however faces a new problem: STRIPS as
well as Reiter’s solution to the frame problem come with
the hypothesis that the world evolves exclusively due to the
agent’s actions and is static otherwise. This forbids to take
actions into account that are performed by the environment
or by other agents. To witness, although Icard et al.
approach has STRIPS-like action theories, it fails to solve
the frame problem [36].
One way of solving this problem could be to not only
consider the actions of the planning agent under concern,
but also the environment’s actions. Taking the perspective
of the planning agent one might call the latter (external)
‘events’ and the former just ‘actions’. Such events could be
equipped with pre- and postconditions, just as actions are.
We have undertaken first steps towards this in our [33].
5.3 Establish a Link with Revision Theory
Revision theory [3] is mainly about the evolution of an
agent’s belief when she learns that she was wrong about
some proposition u. While such revisions naturally also
modify the agent’s goals, the belief revision literature
basically never studied intention revision. In contrast, the
BDI literature contains some papers accounting for this
dynamic aspect [2, 4, 31, 36, 60].
As we have already mentioned, the concept of instru-
mentality should be an important ingredient of a theory of
intention revision: when dropping a high-level intention we
also drop the lower-level intentions that are instrumental
for it. This can be viewed as a coarsening of the agent’s
intentions. In [58], Shapiro et al. gives some intuition on
this instrumentality aspect and its impact on intention
revision by considering relations between a predefined
library of plans (end) and intentions (means). We believe
that this contribution, probably combined with [67, 68],
provides a good starting point. In any case, we believe that
a successful intention revision theory has to be based on a
definition of instrumentality among intentions.
5.4 Connect with Dynamic Epistemic Logics
Closely related to revision theory, the evolution of an
agent’s knowledge and belief when some event occurs has
been much studied in dynamic epistemic logic (DELs)
[64]. There also exist some papers about the evolution of
agent preferences, e.g. [15, 63] as well as on belief revi-
sion, e.g. [62]. However, this stream of research has not
been linked to logics of intention yet. A major shortcoming
of existing DELs is that the author of an action does not
have a particular status. This in particular makes it difficult
to distinguish actions from mere events. A good starting
point to relate intentions to DEL updates might be
Castelfranchi and Paglieri’s goal filtering approach to
intention [19].
5.5 Integrate Paraconsistent Reasoning About
Desires
While having it in the acronym, BDI logics actually say
only little about desires (while BDI architectures do). The
reason is probably that an agent’s desires can be jointly
inconsistent, which, it seems, makes a further logical
analysis of the concept somewhat difficult. An example is
my desire of buying a house and my desire of buying an
expensive car, which are inconsistent with my belief that I
only have enough money to buy one of them. For that
reason, desires do not obey any of the standard logical laws
that other mental attitudes such as belief and intention do;
in particular, when agent i desires u and desires w then he
does not necessarily desire u ^ w.
There exist logical approaches to inconsistency-tolerant
reasoning: the so-called logics of paraconsistency [16].
There seem to be no approaches integrating such logics
with BDI logics. One explanation could be that the former
give only little consideration to modal logics. It might be of
interest to explore whether and how this could be done in a
meaningful way. Again, a good starting point might be
Castelfranchi and Paglieri’s approach where intentions are
obtained by filtering of typically inconsistent sets of desires
[19]. An alternative potential starting point is the numerical
approach proposed by Casali et al. [17] where Belief,
Desire and Intention have degrees: using these numerical
values, inconsistent intentions can be handling in a natural
way as in possibilistic or fuzzy logics. However, going
back to the previous challenge, the revision of intentions
becomes more challenging as it entails to revise not only
intentions but also their associated degrees.
5.6 Clarify the Relation with Game Theory
Just as the BDI model, decision theory and game theory are
also about the behavior of agents given their goals and their
information state. The relationship has however not been
clarified up to now. It should be relevant in particular for
games in extensive form (as opposed to one-shot strategic
games).
The conceptual apparatus of classical decision theory
and game theory includes the concepts of action, belief and
desire. In particular, the quantitative aspect of beliefs and
desires is captured, respectively, by means of Bayesian
probabilities and utilities. Thus, these theories can account
for the cognitivist view of intention. Indeed and as high-
lighted in Sect. , the cognitivist view conceives intention as
a mere belief about the future performance of an action. In
contrast, classical decision theory and game theory cannot
account for Bratman’s concept of intention, which is not
reducible to the more primitive concepts of belief and
desire. According to Bratman, intentions play functional
roles in mind that cannot be adequately characterized by
conceiving it as a combination of beliefs and desires. We
believe that extending classical decision theory and game
theory with the concept of intention might be relevant
when trying to model resource-bounded agents who need to
plan their future actions in advance since they have limited
cognitive capacities and limited time for deliberation.
5.7 Join Forces with the Planning Community
Plans being a central concept in Bratman’s model, it is
astonishing that—leaving aside some early tentatives such
as [8]—no connections with the planning community were
established yet. This can be explained by the planning
community’s ‘top level goal’ to provide efficient plan
generating algorithms. Such algorithms are well-studied by
now, with highly competitive solvers running not only on
classical planning problems, but also on problems with
incomplete knowledge [46] and with temporally extended
actions [9]. Consequently, the planning community
recently moved towards multiagent planning problems
[37]. This is paralleled by an interest in planning in the
DEL community [5].
Some promising contributions aiming at a connection
between the planning domain and BDI agents exist. We
already mentioned [50], but classical planning has also
been considered [10, 44]. All these contribution mix a
declarative and an operational semantics (a similar view is
also considered in [56]). We believe that this perspective
should guide the specification of the next generation of
BDI logics. These logics will be successful if they are
rooted in these two semantics.
According to this point of view, it seems to us that time
has come to reconsider the link between BDI models and
plan generation: the integration of HTN planning into BDI
logics that we have mentioned above is a promising first
step. As mentioned, up to now, decomposition methods
bring a too rigid solution for defining instrumentality
relations between intentions. A more general perspective,
such as the one offered by hybrid planning [38], is to
consider that high-level actions also have effects. Charac-
terizing such effect is not trivial, as it raises the question of
the main (‘primary’) effect [38] of an action. We propose a
logical approach in [32]. Mixing BDI reasoning and hybrid
planning has been proposed in [24]: this work is a
promising starting point even if the primary effect of an
action is not clearly characterized.
To sum it up, we believe that one of the very first step is
to explore how the notion of instrumentality can be
examined by relating hybrid planning and intention
refinement. To do so, HTN and hybrid planning have to be
characterized in a more declarative way in order to
implement in agent languages the ability to reason about
action effects. Building such bridges between the planning
and the BDI field should contribute to push further the
definition of innovative BDI agent theories and languages.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a concise overview of the 25 years old
AI literature on BDI logics, BDI architectures, and BDI
agents. We have shown that despite numerous publications,
some fundamental theoretical issues were neglected up to
now. We believe that the research avenues that we have
sketched are potentially fruitful and should lead to progress
within the near future. We first advocate that the second
generation of BDI logics should be rooted in an effective
definition of intention refinement; next we propose to adopt
Shoham’s database perspective and planning as key com-
ponents of future BDI agents. It will allow to have a
promising and innovative semantics of future BDI logics.
Our short term goal is to be part of this adventure. First
steps on this research avenue are proposed in [33].
Even if the challenges are numerous, the list is still
partial. As mentioned in Sect. , while we focus on the
individual dimension of intention, the collective aspect
cannot be ignored: future BDI agents will run a in multi-
agent environment. It is is clear that the numerous
notions we have introduced need to be fully redefined as
soon as a society of agents is considered. Such repre-
sentative example is the notion of instrumentality:
instrument may be shared between agents and conflicts
may then appear. It is our long term goal to tackle these
new challenges.
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